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Göttingen  MAGKS Chess players' performance beyond 64 squares: A case study on the 
limitations of cognitive abilities transfer

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, University of Kassel
Abstract
In a beauty contest experiment with over 6,000 chess players, ranked from amateur to world 
class, we found that Grandmasters act very similar to other humans. This even holds true 
when they play exclusively against players of approximately their own strength. In line with 
psychological research on chess players' thinking, we argue that they are not more rational in 
a game theoretic sense per se. Their skills are rather specific for their game.
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1. Introduction
It is often a good idea to ask experts for help in solving certain problems. The trick is to 
find the right expert. Many auctions have optimal strategies and equilibria that game theorists 
are  educated  to  find,  and  hiring  game  theorists  as  consultants  has  helped  governmental 
agencies or firms in a number of important auctions (e.g., Milgrom, 2004). But who is an 
expert in game theory, apart from game theorists? This is an important question, for two 
reasons.  First,  if  we  find  that  people,  at  least  certain  people,  behave  according  to  game 
theoretic predictions where others do not, this would help to understand to which extent and 
in  which  cases  game  theory  can  be  used  for  predictive  purposes,  rather  than  just  as  a 
normative theory. Second, it is important to understand the extent to which we can expect 
experts in one field to transfer their expertise into other fields. Many hiring decisions are 
based not on the current knowledge and training of the prospective employee, but on the 
extent to which his or her expertise can be transferred into new areas. Probably Goldman 
Sachs had a hypothesis on this question when they hired chess Grandmaster Luke McShane as 
a trader. Gerdes and Gränsmark (2010) motivate their study on differences between female 
and male chess players (with respect to risk-taking) with the claim "that findings based on 
chess  can  be  transferred  to  other professions  that  are  characterized  by  a  high  level  of 
expertise" (p. 5). 
However, a look at a larger range of chess players' biographies does not reveal a clear 
complementary  talent:  among  (current  or  former)  top  chess  Grandmasters,  we  find  a 
successful  entrepreneur  (Miguel  Najdorf),  a  Harvard  economist  (Kenneth  Rogoff),  a 
papyrologist (Robert Hübner), a former member of Norway's national soccer team (Simen 
Agdestein), a world class pianist (Mark Taimanov), a paranoid antisemite (Bobby Fischer), a 
taxi driver (Nicolas Rossolimo), a psychoanalyst (Reuben Fine) and Soviet dissidents like 
Viktor Korchnoi. Do they have anything in common except for their ability to play chess? 
Until recently there was no evidence supporting this point for the transfer of chess playing 
abilities to other strategic situations. In this paper, we provide evidence on the extent to which 
chess players' expertise can be transferred. The task we confronted them with was the beauty 
contest.  In section  2,  we  discuss  how  our  work  relates  to  two  streams  of  research:  first, 
economists' experiments on cognitive transfer, and second, psychologists' research on chess 
players'  thinking.  Section  3 reports  our  experimental  findings,  suggesting that  a  chess 
grandmaster is not necessarily a beauty contest grandmaster. Section 4 concludes.3
2. Related Literature
2.1. Experiments on Cognitive Transfer
It  is  not  straightforward  how  the  "size"  or  "difficulty"  of  a  transfer  should  be 
operationalized,  let  alone  measured. However,  one  important  aspect  to  be  considered  is 
causation. Presume that we find that abilities in tasks X and Y correlate positively, then this 
correlation might be due to causation or not. Presume that we deal with a group of people 
with a lot of past experience in task (or occupation) Y. For the first time in their lives, we 
confront them  with  task  X and find that they  are particularly  good at X.  It  is natural to 
presume that being good at Y causes being good at X, but this is not necessarily true. First, 
there might be a common cause for good performance in X and Y, and second, there might 
even be reverse causation: People who (surprisingly or not) turn out to be good at task X 
might for some reason have been more likely to survive in occupation Y. These different 
reasons behind observed correlations help us to organize experimental evidence on cognitive
transfer. 
Unclear direction of the cognitive transfer
List and Haigh (2005) study the Allais paradox with students and with professional floor 
traders and report that the latter violate the independence axiom slightly less often than the 
students. This is an interesting result, yet we do not know whether it is due to a common 
cause, like a certain sense of rationality, or whether trading provides training that eventually 
reduces violations of the independence axiom, or whether violating the independence axiom 
reduces the likelihood of being sufficiently successful as a trader. Another study with unclear 
causation is that of Potters and van Winden (2000), who compare the behavior of students and 
of  professional  lobbyists  in  an  experiment  that  reconstructs  certain  aspects  of  lobbying, 
finding that the lobbyists are more rational in the game-theoretic sense and earn more money.
1
Finally, Alevy et al. (2007) show that professional traders are "less Bayesian" in information 
cascades  games, but  perform better  in other dimensions,  whereas professional  traders are 
subject to more, rather than less, myopic loss aversion than students according to Haigh and 
List (2005). These latter results serve to warn us that potentially not only cognitive abilities, 
                                                          
1 Cooper (2006) finds that experienced managers are better able than students to overcome coordination failures.
It is not clear, however, whether this finding is correctly classified as 'cognitive transfer', or whether it just 
confirms that managers are good in managing.4
but  also  their  transfer  might  be  rather  specific  and  should not be  generalized  without 
complementing evidence.
2
Unambiguous direction of the cognitive transfer
Some  artificial  field  experiments  suggest  that  there  can  indeed  be  cognitive  abilities 
transfers in the causal sense: being good at Y causes an increased likelihood of being good at
X. The reason is that task X is unlikely to have an impact on task Y. The prime examples are 
studies on soccer players' use of mixed strategies in simple experimental games. Task Y is 
playing  soccer.  Soccer  players  might  be  good  at mixing  strategies,  as  it  is  important  to 
randomize, i.e., not to perform in a predictable way, in penalty kicks. However, the reverse 
causality is unlikely to be at work here
3: effectively mixing is only a small part of playing 
soccer, and certain players in a team can - and do - specialize in penalty kicks, hence not 
everyone has to be good at it. 
There is convincing evidence that soccer players come close to randomizing optimally in 
penalty  kicks  (Chiappori et  al.,  2002;  Palacios-Huerta,  2003;  Azar  and  Bar-Eli,  2010). 
Evidence  on  the  question  whether  this  ability  extends  to  the  domain  of  other  strategic 
situations  is  mixed  in  an  irritating  way.  Palacios-Huerta  and  Volij  (2008)  find that 
professional soccer players, unlike students, play (nearly) optimal mixed strategies in a 2x2 
and in a 4x4 zero-sum card game in the laboratory, even avoiding serial dependence of their 
strategy choices.
4 However, Levitt et al. (2010) failed to replicate this result with American 
soccer players.
5 They also, and more surprisingly, do not find that highly skilled poker players 
come close to the minimax predictions in a context that is unfamiliar to them.
6 Sports that 
require intellectual, rather than physical, training provide attractive subjects for the study of 
cognitive transfers, as the transfer itself is part of the training. Professionals in intellectual 
sports such as poker should be able to understand and explain what they are doing, in stark 
contrast to, say, soccer players. (Consequently, some of the latter fail terribly as trainers.) 
Hence  it  was  quite  reasonable  that  Palacios-Huerta  and  Volij (2009)  hypothesize  that 
                                                          
2 This is also pointed out in Levitt et al. (2010), section IV.
3 The caveats by Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2008, p.112) notwithstanding.
4 But see Wooders (2010) for a critical reexamination of the data from Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2008).
5 Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2008) use Spanish soccer players. Levitt et al. (2010), section IV, list a number of 
further differences in experimental conditions, but none of these would be expected to be the cause of the stark 
differences in the results. 
6 In the case of poker, where randomization is essential to success, a different result would have left us, again, 
with the question of causality being undecided. The result provided by Levitt et al. (2010), however, has an 
unambiguous interpretation: There was no transfer of cognitive abilities from poker to the simple zero-sum card 
games played in the lab.5
professional chess players would play rationally in games other than chess. An example in 
line with their hypothesis is one of the best female chess players Almira Skripchenko, who 
started playing  poker  no  earlier than in  2003,  but recently got the  "French Poker  Award 
2009".
7 Indeed, Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2009) report extremely uniform behavior of all 26 
Grandmasters who participated in their centipede game experiments. All grandmasters in their 
sample 
a) seemed to be aware of the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, 
b) seemed to presume that other chess players are highly likely to be aware of the logic of 
backward induction, and
c) were ignorant of the idea that starting by playing the non-equilibrium move "right" instead 
of  "down"  would  update  their  opponent's  belief about  their  rationality  in  the  game-
theoretic sense, which could make the opponent play "right" in turn. 
Levitt et al. (2009) challenge this result in their replication: not a single Grandmaster out of 
16  chooses  the  Nash  equilibrium  strategy  at  the  first  node. In  contrast  to  these  recent 
experiments, we chose one which allows a continuous strategy choice: the beauty contest.
8 In 
many ways, the beauty contest is more similar to chess than the centipede game: chess and the 
beauty contest are constant-sum games, which the centipede game is not. Furthermore, chess 
and the beauty contest are practically impossible to solve with backward induction and they 
both have an almost infinite number of different outcomes
9, while the centipede game, as 
played by Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2008), has 7 and is solvable by backward induction. On 
the other hand, chess is a two-person game, while we played the beauty contest with a large 
number of players. And while the expected rationality of opponent(s) is only relevant for 
chess players' decisions in rare instances
10, it is decisive in the beauty contest. Altogether, the 
beauty contest, just like the centipede game, requires a considerable cognitive transfer. 
                                                          
7 Interviewed by the magazine “Card Player Europe” on October 1
st 2009, she argued that “chess players are 
already  formed  to  be  good  poker  players,  they  possess  fundamental  qualities  to  perform,  especially  in 
tournaments – capacity to concentrate for a long time, analytical skills, calculating variations or probabilities, 
and patience”. Further she believes she benefits from the "presumption of intelligence" that other players have 
about  her.  (http://www.cardplayer.com/cardplayer-magazines/65760-phil-ivey-6-10/articles/18741-generation-
next-almira-skripchenko)
8 While the first proper beauty contest experiment was conducted by Nagel (1995), the game was invented and 
actually used in a newspaper contest by Ledoux (1981, 1983); see Bühren et al. (2009) for a historical account of 
the birth of the beauty contest. 
9 For chess, Simon's (1972, p. 166) estimate is 10
120, while Ewerhart (2002) argues that it is indeed 
10 For example, when deciding whether to accept a draw offer in a slightly worse position.6
But what kinds of chess players' skills are likely to be transferable to the beauty contest?
For the centipede game, Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2009) claim to have found the answer: 
backward induction. The next subsection summarizes psychologists' research on this issue.
2.2. How Chess Players Think 
In order to get an impression of how likely it is, ex ante, that chess players are able to 
transfer their abilities to other cognitive tasks, it is important to understand what actually goes 
on when they are sitting at the chessboard. Figure 1 displays perhaps the best researched chess 
position with regard to the cognitive processes of chess players. De Groot (1965) reports on 
thinking-aloud  protocols  from 18  players,  including  the  then-world  champion
11,  his 
predecessor  and  four  other  Grandmasters.  Newell  and  Simon  (1965)  provide  one  further 
protocol, with more extensive documentation and detailed transcripts as parts of a game tree. 
Fig. 1. Position from de Groot versus Scholtens April 10, 1936, after move 16
The position in figure 1 is typical and gives a good impression of the number of possible 
continuations at the beginning of the middlegame. White (to move) has 56 different moves, 
and Black's number of legal moves depends on what White does, though it is approximately 
40. There are about 3,000,000 possible ways for the game to proceed in the next two moves 
(i.e., four ply in a game theoretic sense). What is more, restricting the calculations to only two 
moves makes no sense. Backward induction thus becomes plainly impossible when the game 
tree is almost infinitely large and the relevant end nodes are unknown; there are also no traces 
                                                          
11 Alexander Alekhine; the investigations took place in 1938/1939 and 1943, they were first published in Dutch 
in de Groot (1946), but without the full protocols.7
of backward induction in the protocols reported by de Groot (1965) and Newell and Simon 
(1965).
12
With  some  knowledge  of  typical  patterns,  a  reasonable  aim  emerges  (i.e.,  forking  the 
queen on b6 and the rook on f8), with a possible means to permit the knight on e5 to move 
there. Only strong players will see this possibility though. In this case, it is not backward 
induction that makes the difference but rather the ability to spot the relevant end node among 
millions of others that remain unobserved. It thus makes sense that Herbert Simon often used 
chess  playing  as  an  example  of  satisficing  (e.g.,  Simon,  1955,  1972);  players  calculate 
forward and then stop when they find a reasonable path. Satisficing, not backward induction, 
represents the practical solution to an intractable game tree in chess.
The question of whether stronger players calculate more moves than weaker players, and 
how  much  farther  they  look  ahead,  remains  subject  to  debate  (de  Groot,  1946,  1965; 
Campitelli and Gobet, 2004; Bilalić, et al., 2008). There is no doubt, however, that what really 
makes the difference is the stronger players' ability to "see" and calculate the relevant moves. 
By measuring players' eye movements, Charness et al. (2001) show that expert chess players 
fixate more on the relevant pieces than do players of intermediate skill. Klein et al. (1995) 
find that better chess players consider fewer potential moves from a chess position than do 
players with a medium skill rating, but those they do consider are more relevant, i.e. better, 
moves.  This  is  possible  because  expert  chess  players  have  stored  a  lot  of  positional  and 
tactical patterns or "chunks", which is known because they are much better than amateur 
players or beginners at reconstructing chess positions shown to them for only a few seconds -
but only if it is a "realistic" position, not a random placement of the pieces (Chase and Simon, 
1973; Gobet and Simon, 1996). In support of this interpretation, Amidzic et al. (2001) find in 
a magnetic imaging study that Grandmasters, compared with amateur chess players, exhibit 
markedly more brain activity in the frontal and parietal cortices, which indicates that they use 
their long-term memory. 
This is in line with Kelly's (1985) research on the personalities of 2,209 chess players. The 
results of his questionnaires indicate that the latent variable "intuition" is very strongly related 
to chess playing strength. Kelly (1985, p. 284) concludes that "chess is much more of an 
intuitive than a thinking game, especially at master level."
                                                          
12 This is in line with the examples of thinking aloud by British Grandmaster Daniel King, recorded on a DVD 
(Fritztrainer power play 10, Hamburg, Chessbase 2009).8
Psychologists' research has been nicely summed up by one participant of our experiment 
(on which we report in the next section), who offered the following brilliant analogy: "Have 
you ever looked for mushrooms with an expert mushroom searcher? Where you see only 
leaves and dirt, the mushroom searcher immediately spots the mushrooms: Would you say 
that, for this reason, the mushroom searcher is more intelligent than you?" To a beginner, a 
chess game is as messy as leaves and dirt, whereas strong chess players can spot the relevant 
aspects and use chess-specific patterns that they have stored in their minds. Nevertheless, 
playing tournament chess might provide chess players with a kind of training that has effects 
beyond the sphere of chess, effects which have been overlooked so far by psychologists. 
Together with the fact that recent field experiments with chess players led to mixed results, 
this motivates our own experimental investigation with a large number of chess players.
3. Chess Players in a Beauty Contest
3.1. All Against All
In June 2009, 6,112 chess players accepted our invitation posted on www.chessbase.de and 
www.chessbase.com to take part in an online experiment. They were asked to state a number 
(not necessarily an integer) between 0 and 100, the winning number being the one closest to 
two-thirds of the average. We did not tell them that this game is known as the beauty contest. 
The prize for the winner was a €200 Chessbase voucher, and those in second and third places 
received €100 and €50 vouchers, respectively. We used Chessbase vouchers instead of cash 
prizes  to  increase  the  credibility  of  our  experiment.  Furthermore,  unlike  cash  prizes, 
Chessbase vouchers can be delivered internationally quite easily, and they are as good as 
money to chess players, considering the products and services offered by Chessbase. 
The target number in our first round equaled 21.43, that is, two-thirds of the average guess
of 32.15 and far from the Nash equilibrium of 0. Likewise, the first round in Rosemarie 
Nagel's (1995) first beauty contest experiment resulted in a target number of 24.49. Playing 
the beauty contest online produces very similar results (24.13 in Rubinstein, 2007).
13 The 
chess players' guesses fall within the range provided by other humans.
                                                          
13 Playing the game as a newspaper or magazine contest gives participants more time, and they generally think 
one step further ahead. The target number calculated from a magazine experiment by Selten and Nagel (1998) 
was 14.7; for Financial Times readers it equalled 12.6 (Thaler, 1997), and for readers of the Spanish newspaper 
Expansión it was 17.0 (Bosch-Domènech et al., 2002). However, Schou (2005) reports a target number of 21.6 
when playing with 19,196 readers of the daily newspaper Politiken.9
And what about the Grandmasters, of whom we have 28 in our sample? While the average 
guess in  our  complete  sample  was  32.15, the  Grandmasters' average  was slightly  higher: 
32.96! As the group of Grandmasters is a small subsample of our top-level players, their 
results only serve to give a first impression of our results. More generally, table 1 suggests no 
clear relationship between playing strength, measured using the Elo rating
14, and the number 
chosen in the beauty contest.
15 The OLS regressions
16 in table 2 confirm this impression. 
While the numbers chosen by better chess players  are significantly lower, this relation is 
minuscule in its extent: On average, chess players guess one integer lower if they have a 
rating that is about 210 points higher (or even 310, if we control for "guessing effort", a 
variable which will be explained later).
Table 1 
Number chosen in round 1 of the beauty contest: Summary statistics 
r n Mean  Std. Dev. Median Min  Max
1 Rating < 1600
+ 2646 33.37 23.08  32 0 100
2 1600  Rating < 1800 664 32.01 21.68  30.0625 0 100
3 1800  Rating < 2000 1065 32.12 21.33  30 0 100
4 2000  Rating < 2200 1091 30.98 21.73  27.45 0 100
5 2200  Rating < 2400 551 29.15 20.15  25 0 100
6 2400  Rating * 95 30.56 22.47  22.8 0 100
Grandmasters 28 32.96 25.03  26.175 0 100
All 6112 32.15 22.22  29.6125 0 100
+ Including unrated players
* Including Grandmasters
                                                          
14 Henceforward, "rating" refers to the international Elo rating (see Elo, 1978) if players have one. If they lack 
this rating, we use national ratings, such as DWZ in Germany, which are equally scaled. With some practice, 
amateurs  can  earn  1200  rating points  quickly.  The  group  with  the  lowest  rating  ( 1600)  includes unrated 
participants, whose exact playing strength is unknown to us. However, if it corresponded to an Elo rating over 
1600, the player would, in most cases, actually have a rating. Ratings above 2000 require intensive training, 
preferably  at  a  young  age.  The  world  champion  is  rated  approximately  2800.  The  difference  between  a 
Grandmaster and an International Master is about 200. The expected result of a player against someone with 200 
Elo points more is 2.5 points out of a maximum of 10 in a 10-game match. 
15 However, the mean ranks of the rating groups listed in table 1 are not equal according a Kruskal-Wallis test 
(p<0.01).
16 We also calculated two-limit Tobit models for the first and second rounds; the regression coefficients and 
marginal effects are nearly identical to the OLS regression. Thus, the OLS coefficients, which are easier to 
interpret, seem to be robust.10
Table 2 




































n 4043 1739 2499 4043 1739 2499
Adj. R² .0040 .0931 .0933 .0031 .0841 .0866
t-statistics in parentheses  *: significant at the 5% level; **: at the 1% level; ***: at the 0.1% level 
An obvious objection to this result is that the strong chess players in our sample might 
have "seen" the theoretical solution, but presumed the average participant would make a less 
sophisticated guess. The better they are in chess, the better they might be in guessing other 
people's  guesses,  though  this  supposition  sounds  more  applicable  to  poker  than  to  chess. 
Anyway, as we report in table 2 (columns 4 - 6), better chess players are closer to the winning 
number, but the amount of difference is tiny; a rating that is 320 points higher brings the chess 
player one integer closer to the target number. If we control for guessing effort, this relation 
even becomes insignificant. Again, Grandmasters perform slightly below the average. For the 
whole  sample,  the  mean  absolute  difference  between  the  chosen  number  and  the  target 
number is 18.62, whereas for Grandmasters, it is 20.00. 
Our sample includes only chess players, but their playing strength differs greatly: from the 
lowest level to world class (including a former world champion). While our beauty contest 
experiment does not allow a within-subject comparison of strategy choices across opponents, 
we  asked  the  second  round  participants,  ex  post,  to provide  their  guess  what  the  chosen 
numbers in round 1 had been. They had knowledge of the overall target number from round 1 
as well as the sizes of rating groups listed in table 1, and they guessed the target numbers 
within these groups. For every group, the person who offered the best guess received a €50 
Chessbase voucher.
Asking for target numbers separately for players with different ratings (e.g., rated under 
1600 or over 2400) means rubbing the research hypothesis under the participants' nose. Yet 
the expected impact of rating on the number chosen was low, but not as low as the actual 11
impact, as shown in figure 2. Our Grandmasters did not presume this relationship existed, but 
their guesses were worse than the average guesses.
Fig. 2. Estimation of round 1 results by round 2 participants
These data pertaining to participants' guesses about the first-round results are useful for 
another purpose as well. Rubinstein (2007) has shown that thinking effort, proxied as the time 
taken to make a decision in an online beauty contest experiment, has a marked impact on the 
chosen number. We construct a different proxy and arrive at a similar result. 
Specifically, if r denotes the rating group, n(r) is the number of people in the respective 
group, and G
r
i indicates subject i's guess for the respective target group, the weighted mean of 














Because T and n(r) are public knowledge for all r, guesses that do not fulfill this condition 
are dominated. Guessing effort usually reduces the difference between the left- and right-hand 















Less than 3% of our subjects simply stated T for every group. Because these answers could 
bias our proxy, we eliminate them from regressions that contain GE. 
In Rubinstein’s (2007) experiment, students make more reasonable guesses when they take 
more time to make their decision. Similarly, we find a highly significant and sizable impact of 
GE on the chosen number (see table 2). When we compare Rubinstein’s and our distribution 
of guesses, which represent different depths of reasoning (table 3), we find that the chess 
players in our study are similar to the students in Rubinstein’s study with regard to both the 
mean and the distribution of chosen numbers.
Table 3
Comparison with Rubinstein (2007)
Guess Rubinstein (2007): One-period 
beauty contest
Chess players, round 1
51–100  20% 18%









Rubinstein (2007), who allowed only integers to be chosen, finds that students needed 
most time for answering 22, a number that is close to our winning number and is implied by a 
plausible expectation of others' degree of sophistication. In line with our previous results, we 
do not find that the likelihood of choosing 22 (in our case, a number between 21.5 and 22.5) 
depends strongly on the rating. Disregarding unrated players, those who chose 22 have an 
average of 1874, while the overall rating average is 1889.13
3.2. Round 2 in One's Own League
For  round  2  of  our  online  beauty  contest,  we  invited,  via  email,  those  first  round 
participants who had agreed to take part in another round. In this round, they only played 
against  players  of  their  own  rating  group.  For  every  group,  €100  Chessbase  vouchers 
provided incentives to win within that category.
As we noted previously, all respondents received information about the target number from 
round 1. Therefore, the average guess should decline in the subsequent round, like in all other 
multi-period beauty contests before. One should expect a strong negative correlation between 
beauty contest numbers and Elo ratings in the second round, because  good chess players 
know that they are playing against only good players. That is, the belief that game theoretic 
rationality correlates with chess playing strength should result in low numbers for groups with 
high Elo ratings. Indeed, as for round 1, the descriptive statistics for round 2 (table 4) suggest 
a negative correlation
17, but again the size of the effect is small. Furthermore, it might be 
partially due to the smaller group size for stronger players.
18
Table 4
Beauty contest round 2, summary statistics 
r n Mean  Std. Dev. Median Min  Max
1 Rating < 1600
+ 897 26.86 18.89 21.4769 0 100
2 1600  Rating < 1800 324 27.26 19.13 21.745 0 99.999
3 1800  Rating < 2000 486 25.75 18.51 21.4145 0 99
4 2000  Rating < 2200 483 24.14 18.64 18.332 0 100
5 2200  Rating < 2400 241 23.73 18.94 16.874 0 100
6 2400  Rating * 50 19.11 15.89 14.381 0 69
Grandmasters 13 20.33 17.84 15.55 0 64.01
All 2481 25.70 18.79 20.3785 0 100
+ Including unrated players
* Including Grandmasters
We  consider a further dimension  of cognitive ability with  our beauty contest,  namely, 
information processing. In figure 3, we depict the differences between the first- and second-
round  guesses. Before  round  2,  players  received  two  pieces  of  information:  the  average 
                                                          
17 Mean ranks of the rating groups (with respect to number chosen) are not equal according to a Kruskal-Wallis 
test (p<0.001).
18 We are indebted to Oliver Kirchkamp and Karim Sadrieh for alerting us to this effect: As the guesser's number 
is also taken into account, the weakly dominating strategy is not (2/3)100, but approximately 66.644 for a group 
size of 1000, and slightly less, namely about 66.216, for a group of 50, see Nagel (1999), p.109. 14
number  for  all  players,  and  notification  of  the  approximately  equal  strength  of  their 
competitors.  If  stronger  chess  players  think  more  steps  ahead  in  the  beauty  contest  and 
presume that other strong players do so as well, then these pieces of information should lead 
to a greater difference between the second- and first-round guesses among stronger players. 
As we show in figure 3, however, no such pattern emerges. Starting with comparable means 
in round 1 (table 1), the decrease in numbers in round 2 is highest, on average, for players 
with an Elo rating between 2000 and 2200 and lowest for Grandmasters.
Note: This figure is based not on a direct comparison of means from tables 1 and 4 but rather on the difference of 
the round 2 and round 1 numbers for those who took part in both rounds
Fig. 3. Average difference between first and second round
If we regress the chosen number and measures of performance in round 2 on guessing 
effort (GE) and rating (table 5), we achieve results similar to those from round 1. The guesses 
of the better chess players in round 2 are significantly lower and nearer the target number, but 
the extent of difference is still not very great. In the second round, chess players guessed one 
integer lower if their ratings were approximately 130 points higher (or 170 points higher if we 
control for GE). They come one integer nearer to the target number if their rating is 240 or 
even 330 points higher, depending on specification. The impact of the GE variable in our 
second round, unsurprisingly, is higher than that in round 1, because we used data from the 
round  2  participants  to  calculate  this  attribute.  Nevertheless,  these  differences  in  the  GE 
coefficients are not  notable, which indicates a  certain consistency in  the  decision-making 
processes across different periods. Chess players with a higher GE submit lower numbers, fall 
farther below their round 1 guesses, and come closer to the target number of round 2. Table 5
Round 2 regression results
Dependent variable: 
Chosen number in round 2
Dependent variable:
Absolute difference between 
chosen number and target number 
in round 2
Dependent variable: 














































N 1638 1558 2358 1638 1558 2358 1631 1554 2296
Adj. R² .0141 .1682 .1779 .0062 .1741 .2003 .0005 .0036 .0040
t-statistics in parentheses;  *: significant at the 5%-level; **: significant at the 1%-level; ***: significant at the 0.1%-level16
4. Conclusion: Human Behavior in Chess Players
On ne joue pas aux échecs avec un bon cœur
(Nicolas-Sébastien de Chamfort)
Our experiment provided the potential for cognitive abilities transfer from chess playing 
skills  to  game-theoretic  rational  behavior  in  a beauty  contest.  Two  rounds  with  slightly 
different  rules  (all  against  all  vs.  in  one's  own  league)  and  two  different  performance 
measures (chosen number and distance to target number) should have been able to reveal any 
abilities  transfers. The  results of  our  study,  however, rather  illustrate  the  boundaries of 
cognitive abilities transfer across different contexts (in line with Loewenstein, 1999, p. F28). 
As argued in section 2.2, good chess players are supposed to have a fine intuition. In our 
beauty contest, guesses of better chess players failed to outperform.
19 Further, chess playing 
skills are not strongly correlated to more rational choices in our experiment.
20 Better chess 
players do not look more steps/moves ahead in the beauty contest. This also holds true in the 
second round where the assumption of common rationality can even be rejected for a small 
group of professional chess players with an Elo-Rating above 2400.
21
The results of our beauty contest are in line with those of Levitt et al. (2009) but in contrast 
to  the  findings  of  Palacios-Huerta  and  Volij  (2009).  Whereas  Palacios-Huerta and  Volij 
(2009) claim that chess players are brilliant in backward induction, Levitt et al. (2009) do not 
question  the  causal  connection  between  chess  playing  and  backward  induction  skills,  but 
show that there is still no relation between the likelihood of conforming to the game-theoretic 
prediction in the centipede game and performance in a backward induction solvable constant 
sum  game.  In  line  with  psychological  research,  we  argued  in  section 2.2 that  backward 
induction is pretty useless  for practical chess. The Nash-behavior of the Grandmasters in 
Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2009) could be the consequence of another characteristic of chess 
players: they are highly competitive, especially in two person games. That is, they might have 
focused on  beating their  fellows  instead  of  maximizing  their  income.
22 In this  sense,  the 
beauty contest is different from the centipede game and from chess because it is typically a 
multi-person game.
                                                          
19 cf. tables 2 and 5 as well as figure 2
20 cf. tables 1 and 2
21 cf. table 4 and 5
22 The replication by Levitt, List, and Sadoff (2009) deviates from the design by Palacios-Huerta and Volij 
(2009) in that the former let their participants play more than once, reinforcing motives like reciprocity.17
Considering the results of our beauty contest experiment, we propose that it is hard to 
conclude  that  chess  players  are  beings  of  supernatural  rationality. (Note  that  recent 
experimental evidence due to Burnham et al., 2009, and Rydval et al., 2009, did show that 
cognitive  abilities  correlate  with  performance  in  guessing  games.
23) A  conclusion  that 
tentatively hints how our results could go along with previous findings on chess players in the 
centipede game would be this: On the one hand, "intrapersonal spillovers" (Fennell, 2009, p.
96) from chess to game-theoretic understanding are negligible, hence typically strong chess 
players cannot be expected to see rational solutions where others do not. However, where 
both strong chess players and other subjects see the rational solution, chess players might be 
more likely to behave accordingly (i.e., to choose subgame perfect strategies) under certain 
circumstances.  These  circumstances  were  certainly  missing  in  our  beauty  contest,  where 
social preferences are irrelevant. Future research could shed more light on this hypothesis 
through within subject comparison of different experimental tasks, maybe not only with chess 
playing subjects, but also with, say, poker players or with professionals who succeed in both 
mind sports.
                                                          
23 Burnham et al. (2009) measure cognitive ability directly through IQ test-like questions and show that subjects 
with higher test scores come closer to the Nash equilibrium in a beauty contest experiment. Rydval et al. (2009) 
measure various process-oriented cognitive characteristics and find that the likelihood of dominance violation in 
dominance solvable guessing games is negatively related with short-term memory, intrinsic motivation to engage 
in cognitively demanding tasks and premeditation, i.e., the propensity to think through the task carefully.18
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